Host Rich Kepler relates how he tended the nuclear missiles in the Gulf of Tonkin that Nixon had ordered ready to nuke Hanoi when the Pentagon’s studies showed we’d never win just fighting in the South.

 Lucky for Rich and all of us, Ellsberg outed Nixon’s plan for the Nuclear attack which would have radiated all Asia and ultimately the whole planet.






Guest Dr. Sasha Lessin relates how President Johnson falsified an American ship firing on a North Vietmamese gunboat into a lie about the Viet ship firing on ours; this was his excuse for the war he wanted.

 Guest Janet Kira Lessin warned of the impending extinction of humanity as a result of the ongoing leaks of radiation from the Fukashima disaster, with radioactive water seeping into the Pacific, steaming up into our atmosphere through fissures in the Earth, killing the sardines, spreading radiation poisoning throughout globe, killing fish and giving us cancers. Prolong your life a bit by avoiding eating fish from the Pacific.


On the morning of October 27, 1969, a squadron of 18 B-52s — massive bombers with eight turbo engines and 185-foot wingspans — began racing from the western US toward the eastern border of the Soviet Union. The pilots flew for 18 hours without rest, hurtling toward their targets at more than 500 miles per hour. Each plane was loaded with nuclear weapons hundreds of times more powerful than the ones that had obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The B-52s, known as Stratofortresses, slowed only once, along the coast of Canada near the polar ice cap. Here, KC-135 planes — essentially 707s filled with jet fuel — carefully approached the bombers. They inched into place for a delicate in-flight connection, transferring thousands of gallons from aircraft to aircraft through a long, thin tube. One unfortunate shift in the wind, or twitch of the controls, and a plane filled with up to 150 tons of fuel could crash into a plane filled with nuclear ordnance.

The aircraft were pointed toward Moscow, but the real goal was to change the war in Vietnam. During his campaign for the presidency the year before, Richard Nixon had vowed to end that conflict. But more than 4,500 Americans had died there in the first six months of 1969, including 84 soldiers at the debacle of Hamburger Hill. Meanwhile, the peace negotiations in Paris, which many people hoped would end the conflict, had broken down. The Vietnamese had declared that they would just sit there, conceding nothing, “until the chairs rot.” Frustrated, Nixon decided to try something new: threaten the Soviet Union with a massive nuclear strike and make its leaders think he was crazy enough to go through with it. His hope was that the Soviets would be so frightened of events spinning out of control that they would strong-arm Hanoi, telling the North Vietnamese to start making concessions at the negotiating table or risk losing Soviet military support.

Codenamed Giant Lance, Nixon’s plan was the culmination of a strategy of premeditated madness he had developed with national security adviser Henry Kissinger. The details of this episode remained secret for 35 years and have never been fully told. Now, thanks to documents released through the Freedom of Information Act, it’s clear that Giant Lance was the leading example of what historians came to call the “madman theory”: Nixon’s notion that faked, finger-on-the-button rage could bring the Soviets to heel.

Nixon and Kissinger put the plan in motion on October 10, sending the US military’s Strategic Air Command an urgent order to prepare for a possible confrontation: They wanted the most powerful thermonuclear weapons in the US arsenal readied for immediate use against the Soviet Union. The mission was so secretive that even senior military officers following the orders — including the SAC commander himself — were not informed of its true purpose.

Two weeks later, the plans were set and teams of workers at Air Force bases in Washington state and Southern California began to prepare for battle — loading the heavy and cumbersome weapons in a frenetic fashion. The workers were pushed beyond their training, and there could have been an accidental explosion. There had been near-disasters before. Just a year earlier, a Stratofortress had crashed in Greenland and released radioactive material.

After their launch, the B-52s pressed against Soviet airspace for three days. They skirted enemy territory, challenging defenses and taunting Soviet aircraft. The pilots remained on alert, prepared to drop their bombs if ordered. The Soviets likely knew about the threat as it was unfolding: Their radar picked up the planes early in their flight paths, and their spies monitored American bases. They knew the bombers were armed with nuclear weapons, because they could determine their weight from takeoff patterns and fuel use. In past years, the US had kept nuclear-armed planes in the air as a possible deterrent (if the Soviets blew up all of our air bases in a surprise attack, we’d still be able to respond). But in 1968, the Pentagon publicly banned that practice — so the Soviets wouldn’t have thought the 18 planes were part of a patrol. Secretary of defense Melvin Laird, who opposed the operation, worried that the Soviets would either interpret Giant Lance as an attack, causing catastrophe, or as a bluff, making Washington look weak.

The US had come perilously close to nuclear war before: During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the nation’s nuclear forces were poised for imminent use in response to Soviet actions. And on several occasions, aircraft carrying nuclear weapons had crashed; other times, radar operators had misinterpreted flocks of migrating birds as a Soviet first strike. October 1969, however, was different. This was the only moment we know of when a president decided that it made strategic sense to pretend to launch World War III.

Nixon’s madman pose and Giant Lance were based on game theory, a branch of mathematics that uses simple calculations and rigorous logic to help understand how people make choices — like whether to surge ahead in traffic or whether to respond to a military provocation with a strike of one’s own. The most famous example in the field is the Prisoner’s Dilemma: If two criminal suspects are held in separate cells, should they keep mum or rat each other out? (Answer: They should keep quiet, but as self-interested actors, what they will do is betray each other and both go to jail.) In the Cold War, the “games” were much more complicated simulations of war and bargaining: Would the Soviets be more likely to attack Western Europe if we kept missiles there or if we didn’t?

Kissinger had studied game theory as a young academic and strategic theorist at Harvard. In the early ’60s, he was part of a group of World War II veterans who became the oracles or “whiz kids” of the nuclear age. Working at newly formed institutes and think tanks, like the RAND Corporation, they preached that the proper way to deal with the existence of nuclear weapons wasn’t to act as if the situation was so grave that one couldn’t even discuss using them; it was to figure out how to use them most effectively. This was the attitude mocked by Stanley Kubrik in Dr. Strangelove, in which RAND appears thinly disguised as the Bland Corporation.

One of the starting points for Cold War game theory was President Eisenhower’s proposed doctrine of “massive retaliation”: Washington would respond viciously to any attack on the US or its allies. This, the thinking went, would create enough fear to deter enemy aggression. But Kissinger believed this policy could actually encourage our enemies and limit our power. Would the US really nuke Moscow if the Soviets funded some communist insurgents in Angola or took over a corner of Iran? Of course not. As a result, enemies would engage in “salami tactics,” slicing away at American interests, confident that the US would not respond.

Cluster bombs, designed with “submunition” ordnance to set off a chain-reaction of explosions, became an important part of the US conventional military arsenal in the 1960s. In Southeast Asia, cluster bombs allowed the US military to inflict widespread damage on the enemy from the air, without resorting to nuclear weapons.

The White House needed a wider range of military options. More choices, the thinking went, would allow us to prevent some conflicts from starting, gain bargaining leverage in others, and stop still others from escalating. This game-theory logic was the foundation for what became in the ’60s and ’70s the doctrine of “flexible response”: Washington would respond to small threats in small ways and big threats in big ways.

The madman theory was an extension of that doctrine. If you’re going to rely on the leverage you gain from being able to respond in flexible ways — from quiet nighttime assassinations to nuclear reprisals — you need to convince your opponents that even the most extreme option is really on the table. And one way to do that is to make them think you are crazy.

Consider a game that theorist Thomas Schelling described to his students at Harvard in the ’60s: You’re standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to another person. As soon as one of you cries uncle, you’ll both be released, and whoever remained silent will get a large prize. What do you do? You can’t push the other person off the cliff, because then you’ll die, too. But you can dance and walk closer and closer to the edge. If you’re willing to show that you’ll brave a certain amount of risk, your partner may concede — and you might win the prize. But if you convince your adversary that you’re crazy and liable to hop off in any direction at any moment, he’ll probably cry uncle immediately. If the US appeared reckless, impatient, even insane, rivals might accept bargains they would have rejected under normal conditions. In terms of game theory, a new equilibrium would emerge as leaders in Moscow, Hanoi, and Havana contemplated how terrible things could become if they provoked an out-of-control president to experiment with the awful weapons at his disposal.

The nuclear-armed B-52 flights near Soviet territory appeared to be a direct application of this kind of game theory. H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff, wrote in his diary that Kissinger believed evidence of US irrationality would “jar the Soviets and North Vietnam.” Nixon encouraged Kissinger to expand this approach. “If the Vietnam thing is raised” in conversations with Moscow, Nixon advised, Kissinger should “shake his head and say, ‘I am sorry, Mr. Ambassador, but[the president]is out of control.” Nixon told Haldeman: “I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I’ve reached the point that I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he is angry — and he has his hand on the nuclear button’ — and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.”

As Giant Lance unfolded, Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev had no way of knowing whether this was an exercise, a bluff, or the attack that would end it all (and to which he needed to respond in kind immediately). Brezhnev’s ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, urgently set up a meeting with Nixon and Kissinger.

Dobrynin began the conversation by expressing alarm about White House actions. The president then lashed out at the Soviet ambassador, demanding that Moscow help the US in Vietnam. Nixon declared that if help wasn’t given, “the United States reserves the right to go its own way and to use its own methods to end the war.”

Dobrynin explained that the Soviet leadership understood Nixon and Kissinger’s threat that “the United States may resort to some ‘other measures’ to resolve the Vietnam issue.” But in that case, Dobrynin continued, “Moscow would like to tell the president bluntly that the policy of settling the Vietnam issue through military force is not only futile but extremely dangerous.”

Dobrynin recounted Nixon’s threatening words in his report to the Kremlin: The president said “he will never (Nixon twice emphasized that word) accept a humiliating defeat or humiliating terms. The US, like the Soviet Union, is a great nation, and he is its president. The Soviet leaders are determined persons, but he, the president, is the same.”

Cockpit of Boeing B-52D (S/N 56-0665), which is on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force. Photo: US Air Force
Dobrynin warned Soviet leaders that “Nixon is unable to control himself even in a conversation with a foreign ambassador.” He also commented on the president’s “growing emotionalism” and “lack of balance.”

This was exactly the impression that Nixon and Kissinger had sought to cultivate. After the meeting, Kissinger reveled in their success. He wrote the president: “I suspect Dobrynin’s basic mission was to test the seriousness of the threat.” Nixon had, according to Kissinger,

December 26, 1973: Soviet ambassador to “played it very cold with Dobrynin, giving him one back for each he dished out.” Kissinger counseled the White House to “continue backing up our verbal warnings with our present military moves.” the US Anatoly Dobrynin (right) meets with President Richard Nixon at the Oval Office in Washington, DC.

On October 30, Nixon and Kissinger ordered an end to Giant Lance, and the B-52s turned and headed back home. The sudden conclusion reinforced the madman pose. Nixon and Kissinger may have been trying to show the Soviets that they could initiate threatening actions without warning and then restore “normal” operations in similarly unpredictable ways. This would keep the Kremlin guessing about what was coming next, wondering whether the US would soon send both countries off the cliff.

On the most obvious level, the mission failed. It may have scared the Soviets, but it did not compel them to end their support for Hanoi, and the North Vietnamese certainly didn’t dash to Paris to beg for peace. Nixon and Kissinger believed, though, that their threats opened the door to the arms-control deals of the early ’70s. According to this argument, leaders in Moscow recognized after October 1969 that they had better negotiate with Washington, on terms amenable to American interests.

More than 35 years after Giant Lance, I asked Kissinger about it during a long lunch at the Four Seasons Grill in New York. Why, I asked, did they risk nuclear war back in October 1969? He paused over his salad, surprised that I knew so much about this episode, and measured his words carefully. “Something had to be done,” he explained, to back up threats the US had made and to push the Soviets for help in Vietnam. Kissinger had suggested the nuclear maneuvers to give the president more leverage in negotiations. It was an articulation of the game theory he had studied before coming to power. “What were [the Soviets] going to do?” Kissinger said dismissively.

But what if things had gone terribly wrong — if the Soviets had overreacted, if a B-52 had crashed, if one of the hastily loaded warheads had exploded? Kissinger demurred. Denying that there was ever a madman theory in operation, he emphasized that Giant Lance was designed to be a warning, not a provocation to war. The operation was designed to be safe. And in any case, he said, firm resolve is essential to policymaking.

The following documents offer additional proof of the plan hatched by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to end the conflict in Vietnam by pretending to launch a nuclear strike on the USSR.
· Memorandum for the President
· Memorandum for Colonel Haig
· Notes on Increased Readiness Posture of October 1969


ARE WE ALL GOING TO DIE SOON?   Carpe Diem In Any Case





Last week, Tepco said 430 litres (113 gallons) of contaminated water had spilled out of a storage tank at Fukushima and probably flowed to the ocean.

Cesium readings further out in the Pacific Ocean remain non-detectable and officials say there is no environmental threat to other countries as radiation will be diluted by the sea.

In September, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promised the International Olympic Committee that radioactive water problems at Fukushima were “under control” and any contamination is limited to the harbour next to the Fukushima plant.

Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority last week ordered Tepco to draft in additional workers and report within a week on its measures to tackle the hazardous clean-up.

West Coast of North America to Be Hit Hard by Fukushima Radiation Posted on August 20, 2013 by WashingtonsBlog

 Radiation Levels Will Concentrate in Pockets In Baja California and Other West Coast Locations

An ocean current called the North Pacific Gyre is bringing Japanese radiation to the West Coast of North America:

North Pacific Subtropical Convergence Zone FDA Refuses to Test Fish for Radioactivity ... Government Pretends Radioactive Fish Is Safe

The leg of the Gyre closest to Japan – the Kuroshio current – begins right next to Fukushima:

Kuroshio Current - Colour show water speed.  Blue slowest; red fastest

While many people assume that the ocean will dilute the Fukushima radiation, a previously-secret 1955 U.S. government report concluded that the ocean may not adequately dilute radiation from nuclear accidents, and there could be “pockets” and “streams” of highly-concentrated radiation.

The University of Hawaii’s International Pacific Research Center created a graphic showing the projected dispersion of debris from Japan:

Last year, scientists from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory and 3 scientists from the GEOMAR Research Center for Marine Geosciences showed that radiation on the West Coast of North America could end up being 10 times higher than in Japan:

After 10 years the concentrations become nearly homogeneous over the whole Pacific, with higher values in the east, extending along the North American coast with a maximum (~1 × 10−4) off Baja California. 


With caution given to the various idealizations (unknown actual oceanic state during release, unknown release area, no biological effects included, see section 3.4), the following conclusions may be drawn. (i) Dilution due to swift horizontal and vertical dispersion in the vicinity of the energetic Kuroshio regime leads to a rapid decrease of radioactivity levels during the first 2 years, with a decline of near-surface peak concentrations to values around 10 Bq m−3 (based on a total input of 10 PBq). The strong lateral dispersion, related to the vigorous eddy fields in the mid-latitude western Pacific, appears significantly under-estimated in the non-eddying (0.5°) model version. (ii) The subsequent pace of dilution is strongly reduced, owing to the eastward advection of the main tracer cloud towards the much less energetic areas of the central and eastern North Pacific. (iii) The magnitude of additional peak radioactivity should drop to values comparable to the pre-Fukushima levels after 6–9 years (i.e. total peak concentrations would then have declined below twice pre-Fukushima levels). (iv) By then the tracer cloud will span almost the entire North Pacific, with peak concentrations off the North American coast an order-of-magnitude higher than in the western Pacific.


(“Order-of-magnitude” is a scientific term which means 10 times higher.  The “Western Pacific” means Japan’s East Coast.)

In May, a team of scientists from Spain, Australia and France concluded that the radioactive cesium would look more like this:
And a team of top Chinese scientists has just published a study in the Science China Earth Sciences journal showing that the radioactive plume crosses the ocean in a nearly straight line toward North America, and that it appears to stay together with little dispersion:

On March 30, 2011, the Japan Central News Agency reported the monitored radioactive pollutions that were 4000 times higher than the standard level. Whether or not these nuclear pollutants will be transported to the Pacific-neighboring countries through oceanic circulations becomes a world-wide concern.


The time scale of the nuclear pollutants reaching the west coast of America is 3.2 years if it is estimated using the surface drifting buoys and 3.9 years if it is estimated using the nuclear pollutant particulate tracers.


The half life of cesium-137 is so long that it produces more damage to human. Figure 4 gives the examples of the distribution of the impact strength of Cesium-137 at year 1.5 (panel (a)), year 3.5 (panel (b)), and year 4 (panel (c)).


It is worth noting that due to the current near the shore cannot be well reconstructed by the global ocean reanalysis, some nuclear pollutant particulate tracers may come to rest in near shore area, which may result in additional uncertainty in the estimation of the impact strength.


Since the major transport mechanism of nuclear pollutants for the west coast of America is the Kuroshio-extension currents, after four years, the impact strength of Cesium-137 in the west coast area of America is as high as 4%.

Note: Even low levels of radiation can harm health.

Comment from correspondent:



Fukushima radioactive cesium has been found in phytoplankton, the enabler of all life: In fact, whole colonies of phytoplankton the size of CA are already “dead”. We are killing our oceans, we are killing ourselves and it is much worse then you realize. Phytoplankton provides as much as 80% of our oxygen supply. Three molecules of oxygen bond to form the ozone layer which protects the earth from the sun’s deadly UVB radiation. Marine phytoplankton is the smallest organism on the earth. It’s the bases of the entire food chain. It grows in the ocean and produces more oxygen than all the forests combined times three. It’s the basis of countless medicines used to treat both animal and human disease. Think about the repercussions of losing half of the phytoplankton. A reduction of 40% of life giving oxygen to every living thing on earth. Shortage of critical medicines. Thinning of the ozone layer. When the human brain is deprived of oxygen a condition called cerebral hypoxia ensues: Difficulties with complex learning tasks and reductions in short-term memory begin to emerge. If oxygen deprivation continues, cognitive disturbances and decreased motor control will occur. Continued oxygen deprivation results in fainting, long term loss of consciousness, coma, seizures, cessation of brain stem reflexes, and brain death.

WHAT CAN YOU DO? 1. Write to, call, email your reps and the White House. Demand that the truth be told. Demand that our government Marshall all of its power to help Japan address the catastrophe and treat this as the very real extinction event that it is. 2. PLANT TREES! Anonymous will be launching a global initiative to plant 100,000 trees from saplings. Look for the notification. Join the effort. Share it with everyone you know. Trees will produce oxygen to help compensate for the inevitable devastation of phytoplankton.

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